Can Beijing buy its way with Taliban, then find common ground with the U.S.?
Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, political chief of Afghanistan’s Taliban, in Tianjin, China July 28, 2021. Li Ran/Xinhua via REUTERS
China is concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, and by engaging with the Taliban, it is trying to hedge its bets while monitoring developments on the ground. It wants to be sure that it will have contact with this interlocutor if he is associated with power in Afghanistan or if he takes power [Taliban has now taken power].
China’s interests are primarily security-related. It is a question of ensuring the security of its borders, preventing the rise of violent jihadism in Xinjiang — where the Chinese authorities have detained between 1 and 3 million Muslims to “re-educate” them in the largest mass incarceration of people for religious reasons since the Second World War– to prevent drug trafficking from Afghanistan, to prevent instability from spreading to neighboring geographical areas (i.e. Central Asia and Pakistan) and, more generally, to safeguard its projects and investments in Central Asia and Pakistan.
Economic interests with Afghanistan are not absent even if they are more marginal. Trade is admittedly small (about US$600 million in 2020), but the country’s mineral and energy resources are of interest. If the Afghan situation stabilizes, Chinese companies may be interested in developing projects (some of which are still pending, such as the Aynak copper mine). More generally, a stabilization of Afghanistan could open new opportunities for China in BRI, trade and infrastructure investments, not to mention the possible expansion of its geopolitical influence.
In the past, Beijing had pragmatically contacted the Taliban essentially for the same security reasons. In February 1999, five Chinese diplomats visited the Afghan capital. At the end of this meeting, Beijing announced that it accepted the establishment of official commercial relations with the Taliban and the organization of direct flights between Kabul and Urumqi. In December 1999, it was the Taliban’s turn to visit Beijing. A three-member government delegation went on a four-day mission to China.
Discussions between the two sides reportedly focused on possible economic assistance from Beijing to the Kabul regime. In November 2000, members of the Institute for the Study of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, a major government think-tank, visited Kabul. Significantly, a month later, Beijing’s ambassador to Islamabad, Lu Shulin, met with Mullah Mohammed Omar, who was known to be cold to non-Muslims.
In addition to these visits and despite the UN embargo at that time, Beijing has established economic and commercial relations with Afghanistan through its companies. Thus, two Chinese companies (Huawei Technologies Co. and ZTE) are said to have worked on equipping the cities of Kabul and Kandahar with telecommunications.
After the 9-11, Beijing cautiously supported the American intervention in Afghanistan and used its position in the UN Security Council to support resolution 1368 creating the ISAF. The latter was replaced on January 1, 2015, by the Resolute Support Mission, led by NATO with the mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the institutions of this country (resolution 2189 of December 2014 in favor of which Beijing also voted).
This position shows its interest in the stabilization of this neighboring country. Indeed, even if China did not appreciate the American military penetration in Afghanistan, it considered it a necessary evil to ensure a certain stability in this country. Stability which its companies have tried to take advantage of during the 2010 decade with announced investments in the Afghan copper and hydrocarbon sectors.
This positioning has not prevented the PRC from conducting its own careful diplomacy in Afghanistan where it is considered the least controversial and most pragmatic major power. Beijing has developed economic ties and a security partnership with Kabul, while at the same time establishing relations with the Taliban diplomatic mission in Doha, Qatar. Meetings with Taliban delegations were held in September and October 2019, for example. China has also played a role in the peace effort by encouraging the Taliban to strike a deal with the United States.
Indeed, even before Trump took office, Beijing offered to mediate and help restart the stalled talks between the U.S. and the Taliban. Pakistan has helped facilitate contacts and links between China and the Taliban. These long-standing ties with the Taliban, as well as a strong strategic link with Pakistan, may have allowed China to avoid major terrorist attacks on its projects in Afghanistan, including the Aynak copper mine, for which one of its companies was awarded a 30 years concession in 2008. But the development of this project has been very slow, to the point that the Afghan government wanted to renegotiate it in late 2020 amid deteriorating relations with Beijing following a Chinese spy case.
The U.S. plan to withdraw from Afghanistan has made China’s efforts to reach out to the Taliban even more urgent. Chinese officials have stepped up contacts with their representatives as President Donald Trump’s administration has gradually reduced the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and closed several military bases.
Some observers point to Beijing’s security fears about the ETIM (Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement) as an explanation for China’s interest in re-engaging with the Taliban now. Information about ETIM is scarce. An oft-cited Security Council report from 2020 mentions the presence of 500 ETIM fighters in northern Afghanistan. But this information comes from a single unidentified member state. It is hardly supported by other sources and thus it is questionable. The figure appears to be overstated. This kind of narrative fits with Beijing’s rhetoric about the threat that this group would pose to Xinjiang, which also makes it suspect.
“Terrorism” has indeed been used as an excuse by the Chinese authorities since 2001 to significantly increase repression against the Uighur population in Xinjiang. One must therefore remain cautious. Another force is probably more present. This is the Turkestan Islamic Party, whose fighters have made their presence felt in Syria. But again, the number of its fighters in Afghanistan remains an open question. Moreover, as its name suggests, the objectives of this multi-ethnic movement are more concerned with Central Asia than with the issue of East Turkestan.
In northern Afghanistan, the Taliban may be able to draw on this force because of its ethnic (non-Pashtun) composition. For the moment, on the Uighur issue, the Taliban have given Beijing some assurances. They will not support the Uighurs against China, according to their statements.
China has reportedly offered considerable investment in energy and infrastructure projects in talks with the Taliban if they can secure peace in Afghanistan after the U.S. military withdraws from the country. This would help to stimulate local trade and commerce and eventually investment, which could benefit the Taliban both economically and politically, particularly in terms of local legitimacy. The Taliban are also looking for legitimacy at the international level. Talks with China are therefore very useful from this point of view because they allow them to present themselves as legitimate and credible interlocutors.
Overall, the Taliban seem interested in the possibilities offered by China, as shown by their position and assurances to Beijing in recent weeks. They have pledged not to interfere in China’s internal affairs and not to allow Afghan territory to be used by “anti-Chinese forces”. But some observers point out that the Taliban have hardly kept any other promises (such as disavowing al-Qaeda). Beijing would do well to remain cautious.
China’s latest overtures to the Taliban also underscore its fear that the U.S. military withdrawal will foster greater violence and instability in the Afghan-Pakistani belt, which has long been a hotbed of terrorism. Beijing wants to preserve its heavy investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is supposed to be the jewel in the crown of its BRI initiative, and where it is already facing many difficulties.
In Afghanistan, the local situation remains open and there is no indication that the Chinese strategy will ultimately succeed. It is interesting to note that the Afghan terrain is perhaps one of the most favorable grounds for testing the possibility of Sino-American cooperation.
Beijing and Washington could find common ground to cooperate in the stabilization of this country after the U.S. military withdraws and in the reduction of the threats that may emanate from it (terrorism, drug trafficking, etc.). There is an alignment of interests.
Both are interested in the stability of the country and Washington has already expressed its willingness to work with Beijing in this direction. It is in no one’s interest to see an Afghanistan without security, without stability, without prosperity and ravaged by violence…
Thierry Kellner is doctor in International Relations at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. He is Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). He is associated with several ULB research centres (REPI, EASt, OMAM, CECID, IEE) and the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP, Brussels).
